Can government intervention induce standardized waste management for small farmers: analysis based on the perspective of element transformation
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摘要:
规范化小农户的绿色生产行为是改造传统农业的应有之义。本文首先构建了政府介入影响小农户废弃物治理行为的理论框架; 其次, 基于微观调研数据, 实证分析了政府介入对小农户废弃物治理的影响及其影响机制。结果表明: 激励型政府介入对小农户废弃物规范化治理没有显著影响; 引导型和约束型政府介入通过“改造”小农户生产要素来影响其废弃物治理行为。其中, 引导型政府介入通过提高小农户生产性固定资产投资和技术应用水平来推动废弃物的规范化治理, 而约束型政府介入则主要通过提高生产性固定资产投资来发挥作用。越是高年龄组小农户, 其生产性固定资产投资对废弃物治理的影响越大, 越是低年龄组小农户, 其技术应用水平的影响越大。未来需重点完善废弃物资源化利用的补贴政策对小农户的扶持作用, 同时要继续强化政府引导型与约束型介入的“造血”功能, 诱导小农户改造传统生产要素, 提升规范化治理水平。
Abstract:Standardizing the green production behavior of small farmers is the due meaning of traditional agriculture. In this study, we first construct a theoretical framework for government interventions in the waste management behavior of small farmers. Second, based on micro research data, an empirical analysis was conducted on the impact of government interventions on the waste management behavior of small farmers and their impact mechanisms. The results show that incentivized government intervention has no significant impact on the standardized waste management behavior of small farmers. Guiding and constraining government interventions influence the waste management behavior of small farmers by “transforming” their production factors. Guiding government intervention promotes standardized waste management by improving small farmers’ productive fixed asset investments and technology application levels, whereas constraining government intervention mainly plays this role by improving the former. The older the small farmers, the greater the impact of their productive fixed asset investment on waste management, and the younger the small farmers, the greater the impact of their technology application level. In the future, it will be necessary to focus on improving subsidy policies for waste resource utilization to support small farmers. Meanwhile, we should continue to strengthen the “hematopoietic” function of guiding and constraining government intervention, induce small farmers to transform traditional production factors, and thereby improve their level of standardized management.
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Keywords:
- Government interventions /
- Small farmers /
- Waste management /
- Element transformation
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图 1 激励型政府介入下小农户的生产要素变动
Figure 1. Changes in production factors of small farmers under incentive government intervention
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图 2 约束型政府介入下小农户的生产要素变动
Figure 2. Changes in production factors of small farmers under constraining government intervention
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图 3 引导型政府介入下小农户废弃物治理行为响应(A: 生产要素变化; B: 技术应用水平变化)
Figure 3. Response to waste management behavior of small farmers under the guiding government intervention (A: change in production factors; B: change in levels of technology application)
表 1 变量定义与描述性统计
Table 1 Variable definition and descriptive statistics
变量类型
Variable type变量名
Variable name变量定义
Variable definition均值±标准差
Mean±Standard deviation被解释变量
Explained variable废弃物规范化治理决策
Decision on standardized waste management是=1, 否=0
Yes=1, no=00.788±0.410 废弃物规范化治理程度
Degree of standardized waste management粪污资源化利用数量/粪污总量
Quantity of manure utilization / total amount of
manure (%)54.212±29.752 核心解释变量
Core explanatory variable激励型政府介入
Incentive government intervention是否获得过与粪污治理相关的设施设备补贴(是=1, 否=0)
Have you received subsidies for facilities and equipment related to manure treatment (yes=1, no=0)0.094±0.293 引导型政府介入
Guiding government intervention是否参加过政府举办的粪污资源化利用技术培训或宣讲活动(是=1, 否=0)
Have you participated in any government organized training or promotional activities on the manure utilization (yes=1, no=0)0.318±0.467 约束型政府介入
Constrained government intervention当地政府是否针对养殖粪污随意排放行为进行口头批评或警告(是=1, 否=0)
Has the local government verbally criticized or warned against the arbitrary discharge of livestock manure (yes=1, no=0)0.229±0.422 中介变量
Mediation variable固定资产投资
Fixed assets investment粪污资源化利用设施设备投资额
Investment in facilities and equipment for the manure utilization (×102 ¥)3.500±3.719 技术应用水平
Technical application level掌握的粪污资源化利用技术数量
Number of technologies mastered for the manure utilization0.994±1.117 控制变量
Control variable年龄 Age 岁 Years 49.353±9.371 受教育水平
Educational level未受过教育=1, 小学=2, 初中=3, 高中/中专=4, 大专及以上=5
Illiterate=1, primary school=2, junior school=3, high school / technical secondary school=4, college or above=52.394±0.886 风险规避程度
Risk-defending degre风险偏好=1, 风险中立=2, 风险规避=3
Risk preference=1, risk neutrality=2, risk avoidance=31.724±0.722 牧业收入占比
Proportion of animal husbandry income养羊总收入占家庭总收入的比例
Proportion of income from raising sheep to total household income (%)90.790±15.432 劳动力数量
Labor power quantities人
People2.582±1.281 是否担任村干部
Is there anyone serving as a village cadre是=1, 否=0
Yes=1, no=00.147±0.355 养殖规模
Scale of farming年底肉羊存栏(只)
Number of meat sheep on hand at the end of the year (head)168.900±141.400 养殖经验
Breeding experience从事肉羊养殖的时间
Time engaged in meat sheep farming (a)19.059±12.010 耕地面积
Cultivated areahm2 2.842±9.612 是否加入合作社
Whether to join a cooperative是=1, 否=0
Yes=1, no=00.306±0.462 圈舍与乡镇畜牧部门距离
Distance between the enclosure and the township animal husbandry departmentkm 7.556±9.986 是否位于农区
Is it located in a rural area是=1, 否=0
Yes=1, no=00.682±0.467 
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表 2 政府介入对养殖户废弃物治理决策与治理程度影响的基准回归
Table 2 Benchmark regression of the impact of government intervention on farmers’ waste management decision and degree
变量名
Variable name废弃物治理决策
Decision on standardized waste management废弃物治理程度
Degree of standardized waste management回归1
Regression 1回归2
Regression 2回归3
Regression 3回归4
Regression 4回归5
Regression 5回归6
Regression 6回归7
Regression 7回归8
Regression 8激励型政府介入
Incentive government intervention−0.301
(−0.59)−0.275
(−0.49)2.783
(0.41)9.906
(1.59)引导型政府介入
Guiding government intervention1.696***
(3.54)1.542***
(3.46)25.777***
(4.98)26.616***
(5.34)约束型政府介入
Constraining government intervention1.101**
(2.42)0.910*
(1.96)19.937***
(3.49)20.348***
(3.56)控制变量
Controlled variableYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes _cons 3.763*** 3.616*** 2.994** 3.397** 93.082*** 88.484*** 77.946*** 67.976*** (3.15) (2.73) (2.40) (2.36) (4.78) (4.67) (3.84) (3.32) Sigma — — — — 30.278*** 28.191*** 29.195*** 26.892*** (11.466) (12.076) (11.632) (11.569) F 44.54 46.95 49.09 44.78 5.27 8.06 6.87 7.31 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.2527 0.3396 0.2823 0.3599 0.0425 0.0568 0.0493 0.0658 N 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 括号内为稳健估计下的t值。*、**和***分别表示在10%、5%和1%统计水平上显著。The values in parentheses represent the values under robust estimation. *, ** and *** respectively represent significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical levels.
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表 3 固定资产投资和技术应用水平的中介效应的回归结果
Table 3 Regression results of the intermediary effect between fixed assets investment and technology application level
变量名称
Variable name回归9
Regression 9回归10
Regression 10回归11
Regression 11回归12
Regression12回归13
Regression 13回归14
Regression 14固定资产投资
Fixed assets investment废弃物治理决策
Decision on standardized waste management废弃物治理程度
Degree of standardized waste management技术应用水平
Technical application level废弃物治理决策
Decision on standardized waste management废弃物治理程度
Degree of standardized waste management激励型政府介入
Incentive government intervention1.426
(1.06)−0.418
(−0.71)8.481
(1.43)0.169
(0.38)−0.434
(−0.65)9.079
(1.34)引导型政府介入
Guiding government intervention3.378***
(3.3)1.538***
(3.30)22.689***
(4.16)1.246***
(4.38)1.284***
(2.97)21.093***
(4.15)约束型政府介入
Constraining government intervention1.273*
(1.91)0.936**
(2.02)18.324***
(3.17)0.630
(1.16)0.863*
(1.80)17.051***
(3.03)固定资产投资
Fixed assets investment— 0.083*
(1.76)1.949**
(2.54)— — — 技术应用水平
Technical application level— — — — 0.526**
(2.25)7.371***
(3.29)控制变量
Controlled variableYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes _cons 0.403
(0.09)3.108**
(2.20)66.459***
(3.47)2.320**
(2.33)2.649*
(1.74)57.789***
(3.07)Sigma 4.814***
(15.60)— 26.193***
(12.05)1.417***
(13.43)— 25.986***
(12.40)F 6.38 52.40 7.46 11.66 55.05 7.26 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.0465 0.3742 0.0714 0.1721 0.3967 0.0728 N 170 170 170 170 170 170 括号内为稳健估计下的t值。*、**和***分别表示在10%、5%和1%统计水平显著。The values in parentheses represent the t values under robust estimation. *, ** and *** respectively represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical levels.
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表 4 更换中介变量的稳健性检验回归结果
Table 4 Regression results of robustness test for replacing intermediate variables
变量名称
Variable name回归15
Regression 15回归16
Regression 16回归17
Regression 17回归18
Regression 18回归19
Regression 19回归20
Regression 20固定资产投资
Fixed assets investment技术应用水平
Technical application level废弃物治理决策
Decision on standardized waste management废弃物治程度
Degree of standardized waste management废弃物治理决策
Decision on standardized waste management废弃物治理程度
Degree of standardized waste management激励型政府介入
Incentive government intervention0.321
(0.68)−0.025
(−0.05)−0.481
(−0.78)7.279
(1.20)−0.371
(−0.52)9.658
(1.39)引导型政府介入
Guiding government intervention1.189***
(3.97)0.928***
(2.73)1.395***
(2.99)20.829***
(3.89)1.364***
(2.97)20.473***
(4.10)约束型政府介入
Constraining government intervention0.107*
(1.96)0.707
(0.31)0.986**
(2.10)19.612***
(3.56)0.879*
(1.73)16.759***
(3.15)固定资产投资
Fixed assets investment−− −− 0.858***
(2.77)17.657***
(3.21)−− −− 技术应用水平
Technical application level−− −− −− −− 1.297***
(2.84)23.802***
(4.39)控制变量
Controlled variableYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes _cons 1.385
(1.14)3.388***
(2.73)2.756**
(1.98)55.173***
(2.83)1.845
(1.18)36.854**
(1.99)Sigma −− −− −− 25.921***
(12.06)−− 25.301***
(12.12)F 72.82 68.88 54.73 7.72 52.42 8.16 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.3493 0.4468 0.3919 0.0739 0.4082 0.0786 N 170 170 170 170 170 170 括号内为稳健估计下的t值。*、**和***分别表示在10%、5%和1%统计水平显著。The values in parentheses represent the t values under robust estimation. *, ** and *** respectively represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical levels.
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表 5 中介效应的异质性检验结果
Table 5 Heterogeneity test results of mediating effect
变量名称
Variable name年轻组(年龄≤50岁)
Young group (age 50 or younger)老龄组(年龄>50岁)
Elderly group (older than 50)回归21
Regression 21回归22
Regression 22回归23
Regression 23回归24
Regression 24废弃物治理决策
Decision on standardized
waste management废弃物治理程度
Degree of standardized
waste management废弃物治理决策
Decision on standardized
waste management废弃物治理程度
Degree of standardized
waste management激励型政府介入
Incentive government intervention−0.461
(−0.80)6.322
(0.99)−0.530
(−0.89)11.645
(1.28)引导型政府介入
Guiding government intervention1.440***
(3.07)16.909***
(3.13)1.447***
(3.03)23.406***
(3.28)约束型政府介入
Constraining government intervention0.979**
(2.13)16.061***
(2.89)0.803*
(1.71)14.064*
(1.74)固定资产投资
Fixed assets investment0.083*
(1.75)1.642**
(2.36)0.105**
(2.07)2.837***
(2.71)技术应用水平
Technical application level1.513***
(2.96)7.683**
(2.56)0.541**
(2.12)5.288**
(2.19)控制变量
Controlled variableYes Yes Yes Yes _cons 2.131*
(1.78)43.704**
(2.59)4.555
(1.60)30.894
(1.10)Sigma — 24.239***
(11.21)— 25.311***
(9.51)F 47.67 7.49 66.25 7.61 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.3859 0.0786 0.6026 0.1084 N 86 86 84 84 括号内为稳健估计下的t值。*、**和***分别表示在10%、5%和1%统计水平显著。The values in parentheses represent the t values under robust estimation. *, ** and *** respectively represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical levels.
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