Abstract: The "three-in-one" approach of quantity, quality, and ecology has become the target of cultivated land protection in China; improving the quality of cultivated land is the resource basis for ensuring food security and effective supply of important agricultural products in China. It also helps to achieve high-quality agricultural development. To better understand the cultivated land quality improvement behavior of farmers, who represent a key demographic for achieving the strategic objectives of cultivated land protection, this study analyzed the logical paths and driving forces of cultivated land improvement behavior of farmers. We found that the logic of farmland quality improvement behavior of farmers generally followed the path of "cognition→will→behavior", but there was also the possibility of "cognition→behavior". This can be subdivided into four different logical paths based on the theory of planned behavior, the theory of stimulus and response, the theory of extended value-belief-norm, and the theory of rational individuals. The behavior response to cultivated land quality improvement was not optimistic, and the enthusiasm of farmers could be improved by adjusting the key driving factors. From the perspective of progress in behavior logic and response, the key driving forces of farmland quality improvement behavior of farmers were the business scale, stability of land management rights, awareness level, and policy support. There were linear and non-linear relationships between the scale of cultivated land and the cultivated land quality improvement behavior of farmer households, and the proportion of large-scale entities who implemented cultivated land quality improvement trended upward. The evaluation of farmland quality status of farmers hindered their farmland quality improvement behavior, whereas the awareness of farmers regarding environmental protection played a promoting role. The cognitive level of farmers was affected by the level of information acquisition. The stability of land management rights had a "guarantee effect" for improving the quality of cultivated land. Policy constraints primarily regulated farmland quality improvement behaviors of farmers by providing policy guidance or constraints, whereas preferential subsidies promoted quality improvement behavior by giving farmers preferential treatment or compensation. The existing literatures lacked quantitative researches on the obstacles to farmland quality improvement behavior, the stability of contract relationships, and the behavioral differences of different business entities. Therefore, future studies should use quantitative models and other methods to identify the key factors, analyze the obstacles, and examine policy support programs for farmland quality improvement behaviors of farmers.